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Abstract

Credit Markets and Patterns of International Trade
Even with identical technology or endowments between countries,
comparative costs may differ in a world of credit market
imperfection.

We have explored two kinds of such imperfection, one
involving moral hazard considerations in the international credit
market under sovereign risk and the other involving differences
between countries in their domestic institutions of credit contract
enforcement under incomplete information.

Credit Markets and Patterns of International Trade

Kenneth Kletzer and Pranab Bardhan
Yale University and University of California at Berkeley

I.
The theoretical literature on
often points attention to a

Introduction
the so-called North-South

trade models

general asymmetry of product specialization

in

rich and poor countries, with the former concentrating on goods which involve
a high degree of processing and the latter on relatively unprocessed
or intermediate products.

The origin and preservation

primary

of this asymmetry is

usually traced to static differences in factor endowments,

in the nature of

product and process innovations that take place in rich countries and in
cumulative processes of

dynamic economies of

scale in

manufacturing and

generalized learning effects of a larger initial capital stock in rich
tries [see, for example, Krugman (1981) and Dutt (1986)].

the

While not

coun

denying

the importance of these factors, in this paper we shall abstract from them and
focus on the contribution of some aspects of
inter-country differences
particular we show that

in patterns

credit market imperfections to

of specialization

even when technology and

and trade.

In

endowments are identical

between countries and economies of scale are absent, (a) moral hazard consid
erations in the international

credit market under

sovereign risk and

(b)

differences between countries in the domestic institutions of credit contract
enforcement under incomplete information

may lead to one

country facing a

higher interest rate or rationed credit compared to another and this may lead
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to differences in comparative advantage 1
working capital, marketing costs,

in processed goods requiring

or trade finance.

sophisticated manufactured finished products

We

more

presume that more

require more credit

to cover

selling and distribution costs than primary or intermediate products.
In general the impact of

financial markets on merchandise

relatively unexplored area of trade theory.

In

trade is a

the empirical literature on

East Asian success stories the link between dynamic comparative advantage and
easier financial access has often been emphasized.
on trade and

industrial policy the

allocation of credit and

use in those

In the related literature
countries of

loan guarantees to achieve

industrial restructuring has
standard practice of trade

been cited as

intend to take up many of the
attempt an integration of

targets of trade

more effective than

restrictions and exchange

selective

control.

and

the more
We do

not

relevant issues here; our limited goal is

one part of

traditional trade theory

to

with the

growing theoretical literature on credit markets under imperfect information.
Sections II and III have the same basic model of the relationship between
differential cost (or availability) of credit and comparative advantage,
they differ with respect to

the underlying source of

fection along the lines of (a) and (b) above:

but

credit market imper

in section II we have a

model

of international borrowing with potential repudiation and sovereign immunity,

1
our attention was recently drawn to a paper by Baldwin (1985) which also
traces comparative advantage differences to capital market 'quality,' but in a
completely different way.
Unlike our model Baldwin's model has no
international asset transactions; capital market imperfections take the form
of incomplete stock markets, so that it is risk-aversion and differential
ability of investors to diversify that leads to differences in trade patterns.
We, on the other hand, assume risk-neutrality . In our model it is (a)
sovereign immunity and (b) differences in domestic credit contract enforcement
institutions with international borrowing and lending that lead to the
differential pattern of trade.
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and in section III we have differences in domestic credit market institutions
(particularly in the manner of

contract enforcement and form of

bankruptcy

laws) in the presence of international borrowing and trade.

II.

Sovereign Risk and Comparative Advantage in a Simple Trade Model

The impact of international credit market imperfections on the pattern of
production and trade can be demonstrated in a simple two-country, two-sector,
two-factor general equilibrium model.

We adopt the usual Heckscher-Ohlin

Samuelson assumptions and introduce a

simple role for international

transactions.

Technology, factor endowments,

assumed to be identical across countries.

credit

and consumer preferences

are

In our simple model, the output of

one sector is used only as an intermediate good or raw material in the produc
tion of the other output, which

is consumable.

We further assume that

the

intermediate good must be committed as an input

one period before output is

available so that working

For

labor and capital are used

capital is required.

simplicity, inputs of

concurrently with the production

credit market allows the cost of current intermediate

of output.

A

input to be paid from

the next period's revenues.
Technology in both sectors

is described by constant

returns to scale

production functions which are twice-continuously differentiable and concave.
The output of the final good is denoted by y, and output of the
by x.

The production functions in intensive form are given by:

and

intermediate
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where k
x

1

1

and k

2

are the capital-intensities of production in each sector,

is the intermediate good to labor ratio employed in sector 1, and i is the

proportion of the labor force employed in sector 1.

The total labor force is

normalized to equal unity.
We will assume that perfect competition and free trade prevail
out, there are

no factor-intensity reversals,

interior solution.

For now, assume

given rate of interest, r.

through

and equilibrium entails

that working credit is

The first-order conditions for a

an

available at a
production-side

equilibrium are:

=

=

(f -

k

1

where q is the relative

(1

+ r)q,

)

=

price of good 2 in

terms of good 1 and

k is the

country's aggregate capital-labor ratio.
For this system, we first examine the comparative statics for an increase
in the opportunity cost of credit to competitive firms.

For fixed q, evaluat

ing at an equilibrium with incomplete specialization, we have
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xlfxk

[~/dr]
dk /dr
1
dk /dr
2

fkk +
q

=

-f

xk

-

,f xx f kk - (fxk /

k

1

-

k2

x f
1 xx

(1)

kl - k 2
-xl
II

(kl - k2)g (k2)

If we accept the additional assumption that the marginal productivity of labor
and capital in sector 1 rises with additional intermediate input, so that

-k f
- x f
> 0
1 xk
1 xx

and

fxk > 0'

then
dk

1

dk
and

dr

2

dr

Therefore, with a rise in r

>
<

0

as

kl >
< k2 .

the proportion of the labor

force employed in

sector 2 rises and, consequently, the output of sector 1 falls and output
sector 2 increases.

The

wage-rentals ratio rises (falls)

if sector 2

of
is

relatively capital-intensive (labor-intensive).
In this model,

with identical factor

endowments across borders,

the

outputs of each country will be identical under free trade if the opportunity
costs of credit to firms are the same.

Since only one good is consumed, there

will be no trade (for a model with many consumables, identical tastes
borders ensures this).
the other, then

across

If the cost of credit is higher in one country than in

that country

will have a

comparative advantage

in the
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production of the intermediate good.

Therefore, in equilibrium, the

with a credit disadvantage will export the intermediate
final good.

In order to explain the differential

country

good and import the

credit advantage of coun

tries, we now add to the production model a simple moral hazard model of

the

international credit market under sovereign risk.
Since international borrowing and lending

involves different political

and legal jurisdictions, there is no external authority to ensure that parties
to a contract abide by the terms of that contract ex post.

In the presence of

sovereign immunity, a debtor country can always elect to repudiate its obliga
tions, so that repayment occurs only if the
debt-service obligations.

costs of repudiation exceed the

Therefore, international loan agreements necessari

ly are indirectly enforced by penalties which can be credibly imposed in
event of a default.

Examples of such penalties

the

often discussed are disrup

tions of a debtor's commodity trade and moratoria on future foreign lending. 2
In the case of a financial intermediary reneging on foreign obligations,

the

loss of the discounted stream of future expected profits concurrent with

the

loss of reputation can
institution.

3

comprise an indirect penalty

to the owners of

The amount lent is constrained by the extent of the

the

penalties

which can be credibly imposed.
We develop an especially

tractable model of borrowing

with potential

repudiation for inclusion in our general equilibrium framework following
non-stochastic model of Eaton and

Gersovitz (1981).

A debtor country

the
(or,

2
The points summarized here are made at length by a number of authors,
notably, Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Eaton, Gersovitz, and Stiglitz (1986).
3
Tois approach implies that intermediaries only
positive profits, see Eaton (1985).

exist if

they earn
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equivalently, intermediary) perceives that it will suffer a loss of size P if
it defaults on its obligations.

This penalty can

value of future

Therefore,

income losses.

be the present discounted

an obligation will

be repaid

whenever

(1

+ r)b SP

(2)

where bis the loan principal and r is the

contracted rate of interest.

assume that indifference (i.e., equality in (2)) leads to repayment.

We

Other-

wise, the debt is not repaid and a penalty is incurred (which need not actual-

ly equal P).
Lenders receive nothing if repudiation takes place, so that they lose the
opportunity cost of their loans.

Furthermore, they possess incomplete infor

mation about the size penalty perceived by borrowers.
be summarized by

a distribution over

believe they face. 4

Their information

the size penalties

which borrowers

This set-up can be represented directly as an

game with incomplete information.

can

extensive

We adopt the sequential equilibrium concept

of Kreps and Wilson (1982), but narrow the

possible beliefs of creditors to

those for which the resulting equilibrium paths always entail repayment.

In

this model, revising beliefs which give rise to a repayment equilibrium (that
is, a loan contract such that (l+r)b SP) can be costly to the lender because
a repudiation may result from a movement off the original equilibrium.

There

fore, there is no reason for asymmetries of information not to persist.

If,

however, a repudiation does result from initial beliefs,

4

This part of the model is identical to
(1986).

then a revision of

the approach taken by Aizenman
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those beliefs is a reasonable assumption.

The equilibria which we choose

to

adopt are characterized by loan contracts satisfying

Prob [P

~

(l+r)b] • (1-r)b

~

(l+p)b

and
(l+r)b

where Prob [P

~

~

P,

(l+r)b] is the probability according to lenders' beliefs that

the penalty perceived by borrowers (a random variable, P) is greater than the
debt-service obligation, (l+r)b, and pis the opportunity cost of lending.
this formalization, we have made the inessential assumption that lenders
risk neutral.

Further, we may assume that there is

In
are

free entry in loan con

tracts so that the first inequality is an equality, while the second may hold
strictly.

Therefore, in an equilibrium no repudiation ever occurs.

Since the probability of repayment implied by lenders' beliefs
with rising

debt-service

obligations, the

supply

curve of

declines

funds

is

upward-sloping after a possible initial flat segment (along which, r = p) and
may be backward-bending, eventually.

The entire curve lies inside the corre

sponding L-shaped supply curve in Eaton and Gersovitz
supply curve is identical
generated from a model

in shape to those

(1981).

This type of

in Kletzer (1984), which

with stochastic technology

in a game

are

of complete

information and, in which the probability of default is positive in equilibri
um.

We adopt this alternative approach so that repudiation never occurs

no stochastic element need enter the general
curve is depicted in Figure 1.

equilibrium model.

and

The supply
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To place this model of international borrowing with potential repudiation
into our trade model, we assume that all consumers are identical and possess a
wealth-holding motive.
two countries.

All wealth is held in loans extended to either of the

For simplicity, consumers'

temporarily separable with a

utility functions can be

inter-

of discount, p.

common constant rate

Firms

obtain credit on the domestic market from either the government or through· a
set of intermediaries, which in turn borrow in the international market.
assume that there is no risk or imperfect
second-stage loans.

information associated with these

Consumers are free to

their expected return under their
assets of either country.

We

lend to either country, so

beliefs in equilibrium is equal

Further, we assume

that the rate

that

top on

of interest

charged to firms on working credit is equal to that paid to creditors.
The demand for working credit is derived from the basic production model.
Equations (1) imply that the amount

of credit demanded, b

=

q(x •l), is a
1

decreasing function of the interest rate charged (x •l is the total input

of

1

good 2 in production of

good 1; we also need

productivity of labor rises with

the capital employed in

curve is depicted in Figure 1, for constant q.
and demand curves

to assume that the

is an equilibrium

marginal

sector 1).

This

The intersection of the supply

point for the

credit market in

the

country.
In all respects countries A and
beliefs of wealth-holders in both
each country's government

Bare assumed identical, save for

countries about the penalty perceived

or financial intermediaries.

government of B could be believed more likely

For example,

this model, once an

defined one) obtains, there

is no reason

by
the

to possess a shorter horizon,

hence greater time rate of discount, than the government of A.
by lenders is costly in

the

Since learning

equilibrium path (as we

for reputations to

change.

have
If
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country B has a worse reputation than A, as represented by a greater probabil
ity that each

debt-service obligation exceeds

the perceived

penalty for

repayment obligations beyond a certain level, then the supply curve of credit
to B will be above that for country A, as depicted in Figure 2.

Therefore, in

the competitive free trade equilibrium, the opportunity cost of working credit
in B will exceed that in

A, and A will possess a

comparative advantage in

production of the final good.
In this approach, consumers

in both countries

are creditors and

government or intermediaries are debtors (firms' obligations are
correctly to be repaid).

anticipated

On net one country will be a borrower and the other

a lender; however, consumers face the possibility of a sovereign
by either country.

the

repudiation

The mechanism which leads to a discrepancy in the opportu

nity cost of credit is the sovereign immunity of the borrowers.

In the

next

section, we consider an alternative approach in which differences in domestic
credit market institutions give rise to a pattern of comparative advantage in
the presence of sovereign immunity.

III.

Domestic Credit Market Imperfections, Sovereign Immunity, and
the Pattern of Trade

International differences between the institutions surrounding

domestic

contract enforcement with incomplete information can give rise to patterns of
comparative advantage in our basic trade model under sovereign immunity.
legal framework of bankruptcy generally differs across countries.
lar, the rights of lenders and of a firm's
dispensing of assets

vary internationally .

immunity, the best which a foreign lender
treated on an equal footing with

The

In particu

equity-holders and the manner of
In

the presence of

sovereign

can expect, in general, is to

domestic lenders in the firm's home

be

legal
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jurisdiction (in our model, all

production by final output producing

firms

takes place in their home country.)
A simple moral hazard model of borrowing by

firms is developed in this

section, and international differences in the treatment

of creditors in the

event of bankruptcy are shown to lead to a pattern of comparative advantage. 5
The production model is identical to that of the previous section, except that
we assume that each firm

in sector 1 faces

technological uncertainty.

To

avoid unnecessary complications, we assume that the random variable in firms'
production functions is identically independently distributed

and that each

country has a (fixed) large number of sector 1 firms, so that invoking the law
of large numbers, aggregate output and both commodity
non-stochastic.

We also

concentrate on

and factor prices are

standard debt

contracts without

explicitly deriving their existence [costly observation of the output realiza
tion of firms is an adequate basis for the use

of debt contracts with bank

ruptcy; see Townsend (1978)].
Sector 1 firms produce according to

where 8 is a random variable with support [O, 1] and cumulative
function F(B).
not be

5

adopted.

distribution

The simplifying assumption of multiplicative uncertainty need
F(B)

will be

assumed continuously

differentiable

as

A possible alternative, not taken here, is to portray institutional
differences as differences in the information available to lenders about
debtors, as in Kletzer (1984).
The comparision between Nash equilibria in
loan contracts and price-taking equilibria in that paper and in Gale and
Hellwig (1985) could give rise to patterns of comparative advantage between
otherwise identical economies.
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necessary.

Firm owners declare bankruptcy whenever the current value of

the

firm is negative, and we assume that the owners lose all their equity in

the

firm when a bankruptcy is

declared.

Therefore, under our assumptions,

the

firm's value is given by

V(8)

= max

{TI(8) + BEV, o} ,

.
h
were
current pro f it,

'"'(S) __ max," {8•tf(k ,x ) "
K ~
1 1
1

wt -

vk •t - (l+r)qb} , EV
1

is the expectation of the value of the firm, vis the cost of capital, and
is a discount factor.

This definition assumes that capital and labor

are chosen by the firm after the realization of 8 is observed.

B

inputs

We have

also

defined the value for any given current loan contract terms, rand x •t=b (the
1
total amount lent, x •R.,is fixed, the intermediate input to labor ratio varies
1
with

t,

of course).

In an equilibrium, the expectation of V(8) will equal EV,

which is the price for which the equity of the firm would sell in a
tive market.

competi

Since firm owners, consumers, and ultimate debt-holders are all

the same people, the discount factor, B, is
time discount factor.

1

B = ----

the same as consumers' constant

Therefore,

in equilibrium.

1 + p

Furthermore, we assume individuals are risk-neutral for expositional simplicity only.
In the event of bankruptcy, creditors can, at most, obtain ownership
the firm, including current output.

of

In other events, creditors simply receive

- 13 -

the debt-service obligations specified by the contract.

The present value of

a loan is given by

=

V

- q b ,

where .13

=

The parameter

(3)

1

l+p

9 is

given by

~(9) +BEV= 0,.

so that

1
_ dF is the probability of repayment by our assumptions on technolo-

I

8

gy.

The first term in (3) is the expected value of debt-repayments, and

second term is the value of
debt.

the firm gross of the opportunity

The last term is simply the initial value of the loan.

the

cost of the
The lender can

either sell the firm's equity for EV next period or operate the firm attaining
a discounted expected stream of net income EV, beginning the next period.
parameter,

r,

represents the costs

The lender loses some of
proceedings if

r

to creditors of resolving a

the current value of

is less than unity.

some payment to equity holders,

bankruptcy.
bankruptcy

Such costs could include provisions for

costs of litigation, or uncertainties

cerning the creditors' priority,
expositional way to introduce

the firm in the

The

for example.

This parameter

con

is a simple

international differences in domestic

credit

markets.
In the absence of possible

bankruptcy, the first-order conditions

expected profit maximization, under our assumptions, are

for
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e•

=

for all 8 ,

V

-

X

6f- ]
1-

=

w '

for all 8 ,

6xl

=

E • [ 8 •

(l+r)q,

1

where the expectation operator is

J (-)dF(8)
0

In the presence of possible bankruptcy, the probability of bankruptcy depends
upon the interest rate and amount lent.

Firms take the future expected value

as given and maximize

,r(8)dF,

where

,r(S) +BEV= O.

This implies that

d8

=

qb

(4)
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d8

(8

=

Bf/6x - (l+r)q)

db

(5)

f(k ,x )
1 1

Since EV> O, both of these are positive,

because constant returns to scale

implies that

8

6f

( l+r)q

=

,r(8) , which is negative.

6x

Furthermore, for constant firm value, the trade-off between rand bis

given

by:

dr

1

=

db

La [ a

6f

(l+r)q ] dF/ qb

6x

fa
l-

dF.

Because of the presence of moral hazard, we need to carefully specify an
equilibrium concept.

This model has

much in common with

(1984) and Gale and Hellwig (1985); therefore,
Nash equilibria in loan contracts,
non-linear repayment schedules.

those in Kletzer

following these, we consider

which are equivalent to equilibria

Contracts which

provide zero net value

lenders satisfy:

V = 0

or, from (3),

(r-p)qb +

r

a
J0 (,r(8)

+ BEV)dF - (1-f)

Ja
0

(l+r)qb dF

=

0,

(6)

with
to
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Recall that (TI(8) +BEV)< 0

for

O$ 8 <

9, so that equation (6) implies

that r is larger than p.

Equations (4), (5), and

contracts for the lender

display increasing rates of

principals.

(6) imply that zero value
interest with rising

An equilibrium loan contract is a contract which provides maximum

expected firm value from

amongst those contracts

providing zero value

to

lenders (where the equilibrium expected value of the firm enters into (6)).

A

loan market equilibrium is depicted in Figure 3.
The amount of intermediate input used per unit of final good output
each realization of 8 is lower

for

in this equilibrium with bankruptcy than

it

would be in the absence of possible bankruptcy in a competitive equilibrium of
our model.

6

A reduction in the parameter

framework more adverse
offered contract to the

r,

representing a different legal

for creditors, reduces
lender so that

the value of

a previously

the supply curve shifts upwards.

Because increasing the interest rate, holding the principal constant,
the probability of bankruptcy, the slope of the new, lower
the same principal amount increases.

raises

r, supply curve at

(this can be readily shown using

(6)).

At this new possible loan contract, the marginal cost of credit has increased,
but the marginal value of credit (since the
Therefore, a decrease in
lower principal.

r

will

A reduction

principal is fixed) is lowered.

lead to a new equilibrium
in principal, leaving

contract with a

the rate of

interest

unchanged, leads to an increase in the marginal value of increased credit
the firm.

For this model, a reduction in

slope of the shifting supply

r

to

generally leads to a decreasing

curve as the interest rate

is held constant.

6
The comparative statics of this credit market model are similar to those
in Gale and Hellwig (1985).
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Therefore, a reduction in

r

from unity leads to a reduction in the amount lent

in equilibrium and, in general, to an increase in the interest rate charged. 7
The inclusion of this credit market model in our trade model is straight
forward because of the assumptions which allow non-random relative prices and
aggregate outputs and input demands.

As in the

previous section, we assume

that consumers hold assets in either country and that all individuals have the
same constant rate of discount, p.

Either individuals directly lend or

deposits in intermediaries which lend
with probability one.
treatment in the

to firms and honor their

A foreign loan and a

home legal jurisdiction

hold

obligations

domestic loan receive identical
of the debtor

firm.

Sovereign

immunity rules out credible contracts subjecting bankruptcies to foreign legal
systems.
Equilibrium conditions for the trade model include

=

and

=

where x

1

•l

is fixed for all 9.

It

is easy to show that a reduction in

the

level of good 2 used as an input in each sector 1 firm leads to an increase in

7
Additional conditions necessary to show that the equilibrium interest
rate rises with a drop in rare messy and do not provide useful intuition.
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the output of sector 2

and reduction in factor

employment in sector 1

reducing the expected marginal products of factors

in sector 1.

by

Therefore,

differences in the legal institutions surrounding contract enforcement between
country A and country B represented by asymmetries in the value to lenders of
the equity of bankruptcy-declaring debtor firms lead to a pattern of compara
tive advantage comparable to

that found in the

previous model, individual firms
credit.

previous section.

faced perfectly elastic supply

In

the

curves of

Higher interest rates lead to a reduced aggregate output of sector 1.

The model of

bankruptcy in

this section leads

to a

credit-rationing under moral hazard, in which each
than it would demand at the

standard model

firm obtains less credit

equilibrium interest rate. 8

Larger amounts

credit would be forthcoming to the firm if its personalized rate of
(not the market rate of interest; aggregate loan demand can remain
increases.

A reduction in the quantity

of

of

interest
constant)

of working credit available to

the

firm in equilibrium leads to a reduction in the output of this industry at

a

fixed relative price of outputs.

IV.

Conclusion

We have shown that even with identical technology or endowments

between

countries comparative costs will differ in a world of credit market imperfec
tion when credit for working capital or trade finance is needed to cover
pre-commitment of inputs before

the accrual of

output revenues.

We

the

have

explored in some detail two distinct but complementary types of credit market

8

See, for example, Jaffee and Russell (1976), Kletzer (1984), and Gale
and Hellwig (1985).
This contrasts with the adverse selection model of
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) in which firms either receive no loan or the project
is fully funded.
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imperfection under considerations of moral hazard.

In section

II we have a

model of international lending under sovereign risk, where poorer

reputation

of a country results in its facing a higher equilibrium interest rate (updat
ing beliefs about reputations being costly).
ences between countries in

In section III we have

domestic credit market

differ

institutions (including

bankruptcy laws) along with the lack of a global contract enforcement
nism (so that ex ante changes in jurisdictions

are not enforceable, i.e., a

Brazilian firm cannot credibly commit itself to a
should the eventuality arise).

mecha

New York bankruptcy court

In the model of section II the higher interest

rate faced by firms in the poorer country drives the latter country away from
specializing in sophisticated manufactured
capital, selling costs and trade

products requiring more

finance; in the model of

working

section III the

country does not face higher interest rates but tighter credit rationing with
a similar production and

trade result.

Both

models are examples

of how

comparative advantage explicitly depends, unlike in standard trade theory, on
institutions (in this case, financial institutions).
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